The Potential Role of ADR in NCAA Academic Fraud Cases by Ross, Katherine
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2020 Issue 2 Article 15 
2020 
The Potential Role of ADR in NCAA Academic Fraud Cases 
Katherine Ross 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine Ross, The Potential Role of ADR in NCAA Academic Fraud Cases, 2020 J. Disp. Resol. () 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2020/iss2/15 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
 
The Potential Role of ADR in  
NCAA Academic Fraud Cases 
Katharine Ross* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
College sports have a far–reaching impact on society.  In fact, college sports 
sometimes dictate not only the enrollment levels and reputations of post–secondary 
institutions, but influence city infrastructure, traffic flow, and television 
programming.  Such influence is made possible by the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (“NCAA”) unchecked ability to govern collegiate sports in the United 
States.1  The lack of oversight of the NCAA has sparked controversy between the 
NCAA and its member institutions, as well as between the NCAA and the public, 
over weaknesses in the current system for investigation and punishment of 
academic misconduct (e.g., concerns over due process, failure to prioritize athlete 
interests, inconsistent means of investigation, the unpredictable imposition of 
sanctions, and harm to student–athletes).2  In essence, the NCAA’s current system 
is imbalanced and unfair, punishing some schools but not others, and disciplining 
student–athletes who were uninvolved in any actionable violations.3 
Arbitration, already utilized by professional sports associations in their salary 
negotiations and disciplinary proceedings,4 could improve the NCAA’s system and 
provide more equitable outcomes for student–athletes and postsecondary 
institutions alike.  Arbitration is efficient, confidential, and, most importantly, it 
allows for neutral arbitrators who are specialized in the pertinent area of law.5 
This Comment will analyze the NCAA’s investigation and adjudication of 
academic fraud and its enforcement of policies over college sports’ many actors.  
Section II explores the creation of the NCAA and its infraction process, and Section 
III raises points of criticism against that infraction process.  To illustrate common 
criticisms, Section IV compares cases surrounding the University of Missouri and 
the University of North Carolina, focusing on the disproportionate punishments and 
inadequate due process.  Finally, Section V of this Comment will delve into the 
ways in which investigation and enforcement could benefit from third–party 
involvement, specifically through arbitration.  As an option for investigation and 
adjudication, arbitration could alleviate many concerns with the NCAA’s current 
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 1. David Ridpath et al., NCAA Academic Fraud Cases and Historical Consistency: A Comparative 
Content Analysis, 25 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT, 75, 75 (2015). 
 2. Id. at 78. 
 3. Souichi Terada, NCAA Denies Mizzou’s Appeal, Upholds Sanctions Against Football, Softball, 
Baseball, KC STAR (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/sec/university-of-
missouri/article237792374.html. 
 4. See Christian Dennie, The Benefits of Arbitration: Arbitration in NCAA Student–Athlete 
Participation and Infractions Matters Provides for Fundamental Fairness, 46 U. MEM. L. REV. 135, 
147–62 (2015). 
 5. Id. at 147. 
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conflict response method, particularly those pertaining to the grant of due process 
and the oversight and protection of individuals beneath its umbrella. 
II.  REGULATING COLLEGE SPORTS: THE BIRTH                                              
AND GROWTH OF THE NCAA 
For over a century, the NCAA has dealt with many ongoing concerns, namely 
increased player pressure and inadequate regulations.6  After originally addressing 
concerns through record–keeping and the creation of uniform playing rules, the 
NCAA expanded its regulation power to allow punishment for violations of its code 
of conduct through a Committee on Infractions (“COI”).7  Violations include 
instances of academic misconduct, such as falsifying academic records or relying 
on substantial academic assistance that is not available to the general student body.8  
This system presents problems because the various NCAA administrative bodies—
including the COI—are made up of individuals from NCAA member institutions.9  
Because individuals from member institutions are involved in the punishment of 
other member institutions, including those that may not be as well–represented in 
NCAA administrative bodies, fairness is often called into question.10  Although 
NCAA administrators understand the current system is flawed, attempted reform 
has resulted in the NCAA’s increased power without adequately addressed the 
shortcomings of its disciplinary process.11 
A. History of the NCAA 
The NCAA was not always the center of collegiate sports regulation.12  The 
NCAA was formed in the early 1900s in response to growing concerns over issues 
surrounding collegiate sports.13  Specifically, concerns rose over extreme pressure 
to win games brought about, in large part, by the increased commercialization of 
sports.14  Further, institutions touted the need for regulations to promote and ensure 
fairness and safety.15  As the need for facilitated conferences and playing schedules 
rose, institution presidents began to realize how difficult it could be to oversee 
intercollegiate athletics through faculty or student governance alone.16  Thus, the 
idea for regulation on a broader, more uniform level gained traction, and Chancellor 
Henry MacCracken of New York University eventually called a meeting of 
 
 6. Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in 
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 12 (2000). 
 7. E. Woodrow Eckard, The NCAA Cartel and Competitive Balance in College Football, 13 REV. 
INDUS. ORG. 347, 348 (1998). 
 8. Understanding NCAA Academic Misconduct Rules: A Guide to Promoting & Protecting Academic 
Integrity, NCAA 3 (2018), https://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/2018DIENF_AcademicMisconduct
Booklet_20180321.pdf [hereinafter Understanding NCAA Academic Misconduct Rules]. 
 9. Division I Committee on Infractions, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/governance/committees 
/division-i-committee-infractions (last visited Apr. 7, 2020). 
 10. Smith, supra note 6, at 17. 
 11. Id. at 12. 
 12. Id. at 12–13 (early interschool athletic events were often organized by students and sponsored by 
wealthy businesses). 
 13. Id. at 12. 
 14. Id. at 11. 
 15. Id. at 12. 
 16. Smith, supra note 6, at 11. 
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representatives of the nation’s major intercollegiate football programs.17  This was 
the first of many meetings from which the NCAA began to take shape.18 
Following World War II, increased access to higher education across the nation 
led to greater public interest in collegiate athletics.19  Increased radio and television 
use in American homes created more broadcasting opportunities, and the NCAA 
signed its first television contract in the 1950s for one million dollars.20  Also during 
that time, college sports encountered its first gambling scandals, complaints of 
excessive recruiting, and a resulting wave of strong reform in punishment 
procedures.21  Member institutions were separated into Divisions I, II, and III in the 
1970s to help reflect the competitive capacity of smaller schools in comparison to 
larger ones.22 
By the mid–1970s, the NCAA had acquired additional authority to punish 
school athletes, coaches, and administrators directly.23  This increase in power was 
met with heavy criticism from the public, primarily due to the purportedly unfair 
enforcement of NCAA policies.24  Meanwhile, university and college 
administrators began to recognize the revenue and reputational gain tied to the 
success of their athletic programs.25  Accordingly, presidents of institutions started 
to play an active role in NCAA governance and proposed rule changes.26  For 
example, the Board of Directors is the highest governing body for Division I, made 
up of twenty–four members with seats that rotate between all the member 
institutions.27  The Presidential Forum is the advisory body for the Board, and it is 
made up of thirty–two presidents and chancellors of member institutions—over 
one–thousand colleges and universities28—representing each conference.29  
Subsequently, the line between member institution employees and NCAA 
employees blurred, and further concern grew over fair judgment and due process 
with regard to infraction procedures.30  As one sports writer commented, “There is 
no doubt who is running college sports.  It’s the college presidents.”31 
 
 17. Id. at 12. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 14. 
 20. Id. at 15. 
 21. Id. at 14. 
 22. Smith, supra note 6, at 15 (for example, smaller schools are categorized as Division III and only 
compete against other Division III schools). 
 23. Id. at 16. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Brian Burnsed et al., How the NCAA Works, NCAA (2015), http://www.ncaa.org/champion/how-
ncaa-works. 
 28. What is the NCAA?, NCAA (Jan. 2020), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-
101/what-ncaa. 
 29. Burnsed et al., supra note 27. 
 30. Smith, supra note 6, at 17. 
 31. Rodney K. Smith, The National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Death Penalty: How Educators 
Punish Themselves and Others, 62 IND. L. J. 985, 997 (1987). 
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B.  Investigation and Enforcement                                                               
of Academic Fraud 
The latest NCAA infraction model categorizes misconduct into four levels.32  
Level 1 violations include only the most egregious conduct, while the Level 4 
designation is reserved for the most minor infractions.33  Academic misconduct is 
considered to be Level 1, even if only to dispel accusations of leniency for non–
action that arose amid the first highly–publicized academic misconduct 
allegations.34  Academic misconduct includes alteration or falsification of an 
academic record, as well as substantial academic assistance from school staff that 
is not generally available to the school’s students.35  There are generally two factors 
the NCAA considers when determining whether to get involved in an instance of 
academic misconduct.36  First, the NCAA will examine whether the act committed 
affected the particular athlete’s eligibility.37  Next, the NCAA will ascertain whether 
members of the athletic department, administration, or faculty participated in the 
alleged misconduct.38  The NCAA expects member institutions to enforce policies 
pertaining to academic misconduct and report misconduct to the COI if it reaches a 
certain threshold of severity.39 
The COI is an independent administrative body made up of volunteers,  
typically current or former member institution staff, members of the general public 
with formal legal training, and athletic administrators with compliance 
experience.40  The COI is responsible for investigating and deciding cases involving 
the alleged infractions of NCAA member institutions.41  To fulfill that role, the COI 
conducts hearings, finds facts, determines violations of NCAA policies, and hands 
down punishment.42  Penalties for violations include public reprimand and censure, 
athletic department probation, vacating of wins, development of comprehensive 
educational programs on NCAA legislation, payment of fines, and the submittal of 
a report of misconduct to the institution’s accrediting agency.43  Although the COI 
panel appears impartial, its findings have created an imbalanced system of 
investigation and punishments. 
III.  AN IMBALANCED SYSTEM 
Through the creation of the term “student–athlete,” the NCAA attempted to 
convey that college athletes are students first while also protecting itself against any 
workers’ compensation legal battles.44  The NCAA’s blatant invention of new 
 
 32. New Violation Structure Introduced, NCAA (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resource
s/media-center/news/new-violation-structure-introduced. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Understanding NCAA Academic Misconduct Rules, supra note 8. 
 36. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 80. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.  See generally Division I Committee on Infractions, supra note 9. 
 40. Division I Committee on Infractions, supra note 9. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 91, 94–95. 
 44. Id. at 77. 
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terminology to maintain its desired image, in combination with a lack of 
transparency in its investigations, has caused many to lose faith in the 
organization.45  Due process is rarely available for coaches and athletes punished 
by the NCAA.46  Further, the NCAA’s reputation for inconsistent enforcement 
brings into question whether current policy discourages honesty.47  Critics argue 
that when it comes to internal investigations and self–reporting, transparency can 
result in harsher punishment.48  These primary criticisms—lack of due process and 
inconsistency of enforcement—are explored below. 
A.  Creation of the “Student–Athlete” 
The term “student–athlete” was coined by the NCAA in order to obscure the 
relationship between college athletes and the universities they attend.49   As a past 
NCAA Executive Director wrote: 
[The] threat was the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be identified 
as employees by state industrial commissions and the courts.  We crafted 
the term student–athlete, and soon it was embedded in all NCAA rules and 
interpretations as a mandated substitute for such words as players and 
athletes.  We told college publicists to speak of “college teams,” not 
football or basketball “clubs,” a word common to the pros.50 
By characterizing college athletes as “student–athletes,” the NCAA forestalls 
some athletes from being labeled as employees.51  In effect, then, the NCAA—
estimated to be a sixty–billion dollar industry—has a free pass to employ students 
without paying them a competitive wage.52  The NCAA is supported entirely by 
revenue garnered through college sports, yet the athletes, who provide the abilities 
and talent needed for these sports to succeed, are denied the typical benefits an 
employee might receive in any other context.53  Most pertinent to this discussion, 
the NCAA avoids the legal responsibility for “student–athletes” that would 
normally accompany an employer–employee relationship.54  When the NCAA 
infringes on athletes’ rights, it might do so in a surreptitious way, for example, by 
rendering a student ineligible to play a sport, suspending or dismissing a coach, 
withdrawing scholarships, or banning a student from postseason play.55  Such 
 
 45. Id. at 99. 
 46. Joshua J. Despain, From off the Bench: The Potential Role of the U.S. Department of Education 
in Reforming Due Process in the NCAA, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1285, 1292 (2015). 
 47. Alex Schiffer et al., Mizzou Football Team Banned from Bowl This Season as Part of Academic 
Fraud Penalties, KC STAR (Feb. 3, 2019), https://www.kansascity.com/sports/college/sec/university-of-
missouri/article225339255.html. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Robert A. McCormick & Amy Christian McCormick, The Myth of the Student–Athlete: The 
College Athlete as Employee, 81 WASH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2006). 
 50. Sean Gregory, College Athletes Need to Unionize, Now, TIME (Sept. 28 2013), https://keepings
core.blogs.time.com/2013/09/28/college-athletes-need-to-unionize-now/. 
 51. McCormick & McCormick, supra note 49, at 74. 
 52. Id. at 75–76. 
 53. Id. at 76. 
 54. Id. at 86. 
 55. Despain, supra note 46, at 1292. 
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penalties represent a deprivation of liberty and/or property.56  Therefore, individuals 
and institutions subject to punishment are, under the purview of the United States 
Constitution, entitled to due process.57 
B.  A Question of Due Process 
Currently, the NCAA is not restricted by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due 
process requirements.58  The Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted by the 
courts to mean that a private actor is engaged in state action when his or her private 
conduct is so involved with the government that it calls for Constitutional limits.59  
Before the 1970s, the NCAA was deemed to be a state actor by the courts because 
of its dependence on public universities.60  In the 1980s, however, in NCAA v. 
Tarkanian, the United States Supreme Court officially determined the NCAA’s 
imposition of sanctions on a public university did not make the otherwise private 
association a state actor.61  The COI, as a result of the investigation of recruiting 
practices at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (“UNLV”), uncovered thirty–eight 
violations committed by UNLV personnel.62  Among other issues, violations were 
related to the basketball team’s recruiting and failure to provide full cooperation 
with the NCAA investigation.63  Ten violations implicated head basketball coach 
Jerry Tarkanian.64  The NCAA and investigators from the University worked in 
tandem during the inspection, and the NCAA subsequently placed the basketball 
team on a two–year probation and demanded the University sever all ties with 
Tarkanian or face additional penalties.65  Although the NCAA was authorized to 
impose penalties on rule–breaking member institutions, it was not authorized to 
sanction member institutions’ employees.66  Tarkanian brought suit in Nevada state 
court, alleging he had been deprived of his Fourteenth Amendment due process 
rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.67 
While the Nevada court found that the NCAA’s conduct constituted state 
action, the Supreme Court reversed in a 5–4 decision, holding that the NCAA’s role 
in Tarkanian’s suspension did not constitute state action, nor was the association a 
state actor because UNLV suspended Tarkanian in compliance with the NCAA’s 
rules.68  Put simply, UNLV’s decision to adopt NCAA rules did not transform those 
rules into state rules.69  Justice White’s dissenting opinion, which was supported by 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1294. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 180 (1988). 
 62. Id. at 179. 
 63. Id. at 186. 
 64. Id. at 185–86. 
 65. Id. at 200. 
 66. Id. at 179. 
 67. A 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim allows an individual to bring a suit against any person “who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of 
Columbia” deprives that individual of his or her rights created by the U.S Constitution or federal statutes.  
 68. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 180. 
 69. Id. at 179–80. 
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three others,70 argued precedent required the arrangement be deemed state action, 
as both entities were responsible for the decision to fire Coach Tarkanian.71 
If the majority had agreed with Justice White, and the NCAA’s sanctions were 
deemed to be state action, then the court would also likely have ruled that Tarkanian 
had been deprived of his right to due process.72  The Fourteenth Amendment, 
however, only applies to those acting under the “color of state law.”  Thus, the 
NCAA was not held to the same standard of due process as the state and remains  
free from defending against due process allegations brought by coaches and 
athletes.73  This decision set a precedent for the NCAA’s unlimited governance of 
collegiate sports because the NCAA no longer has to answer to the government for 
its involvement in university punishment, and individuals are unable to appeal their 
punishments outside of the NCAA.74 
Justice White’s dissent raised concerns that are arguably more applicable today 
than they were in 1988.  Since Tarkanian, numerous college sports scandals, 
involving academic fraud, recruiting violations, and improper pay to athletes, have 
arisen across the United States.75  An FBI–led investigation in 2017 uncovered 
multiple six–figure payments to college basketball players, as well as bribes to 
coaches.76  More than a quarter of Division I institutions were caught committing 
major violations such as recruiting infractions or academic fraud between 2005 and 
2015.77  As one scandal after another came to light, the public and the accused 
institutions began to question whether those involved were receiving due process 
from the NCAA and its COI.78  The reality of the sweeping and often inconsistent 
NCAA–imposed penalties is that student–athletes may be unjustly punished for the 
systemic failures of their schools, coaches, and administrators, making system 
reform imperative.79 
III.  INCONSISTENT SANCTIONS 
The NCAA’s COI, responsible for imposing sanctions on schools engaged in 
misconduct, has been facetiously referred to as the “random punishment generator” 
for allegedly imposing sanctions with no uniform system.80  A more serious 
criticism of the system is that the NCAA uses situational ethics in determining when 
to investigate and implement sanctions.81  Situational ethics presumes that those in 
 
 70. Id. (Justices Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor joined Justice White in dissent). 
 71. Id. at 200. 
 72. Id. at 187. 
 73. NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 193. 
 74. Id. at 179. 
 75. Sean Gregory, N.C. Academic Fraud Decision Exposes College Sports Hypocrisy, TIME (Oct. 13, 
2017), https://time.com/4981782/north-carolina-academic-fraud-decision-exposes-college-sports-hypo
crisy/. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Doug Lederman, The Rule Breakers, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 11, 2016), https://insidehighered.c
om/news/2016/01/11/96-division-i-colleges-violated-major-ncaa-rules-last-decade. 
 78. Schiffer, supra note 47. 
 79. Gregory, supra note 50. 
 80. Joan Niesen, The NCAA’s Random Punishment Generator Hit Missouri at the Worst Possible 
Time, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (2019), https://www.si.com/college/2019/01/31/missouri-postseason-ban-
ncaa-barry-odom-kelly-bryant. 
 81. Sara Ganim, NCAA Punishment is Anyone’s Guess, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2015/08/12/us/n
caa-academic-fraud/index.html (last updated Aug. 12, 2015). 
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authoritative positions will make decisions based on what will benefit a certain 
situation rather than what is right.82  Studies have shown that the NCAA is more 
likely to punish an institution that does not generate as much revenue than 
institutions with booming athletic departments.83  As one researcher commented, 
“What is best for the situation is best for the NCAA.”84  Comparing the University 
of North Carolina’s (“UNC”) institutional academic fraud that went unpunished 
with the University of Missouri’s heavy sanctions after a rogue tutor engaged in 
academic misconduct reveals just one example of the NCAA’s situational ethics.85  
Such inconsistent implementation can harm athletes’ education, as well as their 
athletic careers.86  To avoid such disparate treatment in the future, the NCAA needs 
to implement a more consistent, neutral, and predictable system.87 
A.  The University of North Carolina 
A study published by the Journal of Legal Aspects of Sport in 2015 analyzed 
the consistency of the NCAA’s COI decisions to impose sanctions on institutions 
for academic fraud in men’s basketball and football since 1990.88  The study was 
inspired by a string of decisions declining to investigate several serious allegations 
of collusion between athletic department officials among large, Power Five 
Conference institutions intended to impact athletes’ eligibility with fraudulent 
grades.89  The study compared cases of academic fraud adjudicated by the COI to 
similar cases that were not so adjudicated.90  Basketball and football were chosen 
for review based on the majority of revenue these sports bring in for member 
institutions.91 
Results of the study showed that many of the same issues that meet both tests 
for academic fraud—staff involvement and effecting eligibility—permeate cases 
the NCAA declined to investigate or adjudicate.92  In cases left uninvestigated, most 
notably involving UNC, many students were found to have participated in no–show 
classes and unauthorized grade changes in order to remain eligible athletes.93  At 
least two UNC staff members were directly involved in that particular case.94  These 
two facts constitute a prima facie case of academic fraud that should have been 
investigated by both UNC and the NCAA.95  The NCAA, however, determined that 
the classes were not a scheme to keep players eligible, as they were offered to both 
 
 82. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 76. 
 83. Ganim, supra note 81. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Sara  Ganim  &  Devon  Sayers,  UNC  Report  Finds  18 Years  of  Academic  Fraud to Keep 
Athletes Playing, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2014/10/22/us/unc-report-academic-fraud/index.html 
(last updated Oct. 23, 2014); Schiffer, supra note 47. 
 86. Niesen, supra note 80; Gregory, supra note 50. 
 87. Niesen, supra note 80. 
 88. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 77. 
 89. Id. at 78.  Specifically, the University of Michigan, the University of North Carolina, and Auburn 
University. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 77. 
 92. Id. at 95. 
 93. Id. at 96. 
 94. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 96. 
 95. Id. 
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athletes and non–athletes.96  Later, the former head football coach, John Bunting, 
directly contradicted the NCAA’s conclusion by admitting he knew of the phony 
courses and stated they were part of a strategy designed to keep players eligible.97  
A report produced in the course of the University’s own investigation shows that, 
during Bunting’s years as head coach, there was a pronounced rise in enrollment of 
football players in the suspect courses.98  The NCAA did not finish its own inquiry 
until 2017, three years after the University’s internal investigation was finalized.99  
The NCAA found that UNC had not violated NCAA academic rules.100 
In contrast with the UNC investigation, the case of the much smaller Marshall 
University involved allegations of academic fraud in which an assistant professor 
provided advanced copies of an exam to football players, then attempted to cover 
up his mistake by giving all students an “A” grade.101  Much like the UNC case, 
there was no evidence the professor acted in concert with the athletic department, 
and the benefit of the high grade was offered to every student in the class, not just 
athletes.102  Despite the similarities to the UNC case, however, the NCAA 
determined the institution had committed a Level 1 academic fraud violation—the 
most serious of violations.103  Disparate treatment in dealing with comparable acts 
likely stems from the fact that Marshall University, unlike UNC, is not an athletic 
powerhouse, and thus lacks the same amount of leverage over the NCAA. 
This is just one of the many examples disclosed in the study, and it perfectly 
illustrates the unexplained factual similarities between adjudicated and 
unadjudicated cases.104  Another example from the study discusses the virtually 
identical cases of academic fraud between Arkansas State University and Florida 
State University.105  While both cases involved student–athletes receiving grade 
changes and competing while ineligible, Florida State received no monetary fine 
while Arkansas State was fined nearly forty–four thousand dollars from an athletic 
budget that is small by Division I standards.106  Florida State is a strong football 
school that won a national title in 2014,107 and the majority of the NCAA’s revenue 
comes from such championship games.108  The discrepancy in the punishments 
levied against Florida State and Arkansas State suggest that the NCAA chooses 
when to get involved in academic fraud cases based on how much it benefits from 
a given institution’s autonomy.109  UNC and other similar athletic powerhouses like 
Florida State are much more valuable to the NCAA’s revenue stream than Marshall 
 
 96. Id. 
 97. Ganim & Sayers, supra note 85. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Bill Chappell, NCAA ‘Could not Conclude Academic Violations’ in UNC Athletics Scandal, NPR 
(Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/13/557581005/ncaa-could-not-conc
lude-academic-violations-in-unc-athletics-scandal. 
 100. Gregory, supra note 75. 
 101. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 97. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 95. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Associated Press, Florida State Wins National Title with Touchdown in Final Seconds, ESPN (Jan. 
7, 2014), https://www.espn.com/college-football/recap?gameId=340060002. 
 108. Where Does the Money Go?, NCAA (2018–19), http://www.ncaa.org/about/where-does-money-
go. 
 109. Ridpath, supra note 1, at 95. 
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University and Arkansas State.110  It is no surprise, then, that the study found the 
COI takes into consideration what institution it will be investigating before 
determining “proper” sanctions.111 
B.  The University of Missouri 
More recently, the University of Missouri was penalized for academic 
misconduct after a tutor self–reported completing coursework for twelve student–
athletes for the duration of 2016.112  The University fully cooperated with the 
subsequent NCAA investigation of the allegations, a decision they later learned was 
a mistake.113  In UNC’s case, the athletic department stood behind its offering of 
sham courses, arguing that such conduct was admissible because the courses were 
open to athletes and non–athletes alike.114  Yet, in Missouri’s case, simply admitting 
fault authorized the NCAA to impose harsh sanctions.114  Missouri received post–
season bans on all sports involved, recruiting restrictions, scholarship reductions, 
vacated wins, and a three–year probation.115 
In the past two decades, across 360 Division I institutions, approximately nine 
football bowl game bans have occurred, and only for the most serious of 
violations.116  Missouri received this punishment despite the COI panel noting that 
“the record does not support a broader institutional scheme.”117  When asked 
whether such punishments might discourage schools from self–reporting to the 
NCAA, the Chief Hearing Officer stated, “Hopefully schools would accept 
responsibility like Missouri did.”118  That seems unlikely, as Missouri’s case has 
demonstrated a heavy incentive to do otherwise.119 
The University of Missouri immediately attempted to appeal the imposed 
sanctions,  focusing on an abuse of discretion argument.120  A former compliance 
officer for the University who was involved in the initial investigation believed 
there was hope of overturning the post–season bans based on the NCAA’s own 
bylaws.121  The bylaws intend to promote protection of current student–athlete 
welfare, while the investigation promoted the punishment of current student–
athletes who were not involved in the actual violations.122 
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Punishment will have serious repercussions for the University of Missouri.  A 
study completed by Appalachian State University in 2013 found that football bowl 
bans on Division I universities lower the quantity of applications, admittances, and 
enrollment.123  Additionally, the limits on recruiting and reduction in the athletic 
budget will have an impact that may take years of recovery.124  University of 
Missouri athletes, coaches, and administrators feel the sanctions are unfair and have 
expressed that sentiment openly.125  Because the violations occurred in 2015, most 
of the punishment falls on student–athletes who were not involved in the punishable 
conduct.126  The students who participated in the academic fraud have long since 
graduated.127  Additionally, the University waited on the appeal process until 
November 2019, ten months from the date the original sanctions were levied.128  An 
unprecedented amount of time passed with no decision rendered.129  Missouri’s case 
is not the only cause for concern when it comes to NCAA enforcement.130  Unrest 
over the NCAA’s persistent inconsistency demands a different approach, and one 
that is not entirely foreign to the world of sports.131  Alternative dispute resolution 
methods have the potential to restore impartiality, fairness, and trust in 
intercollegiate athletics.132 
C.  Criticism of the NCAA System 
The NCAA’s refusal to punish the University of North Carolina for nearly two 
decades of academic fraud established a status quo of inconsistent, money–
dependent enforcement.133  Over the course of fourteen years, thousands of UNC 
athletes participated in no–show classes and received unauthorized grade 
changes.134  Despite striking similarities to other cases of academic fraud punished 
by the NCAA, the NCAA declined to hand down punishment, characterizing the 
problem as an institutional issue, rather than an athletic one.135  Other member 
institutions, outraged by the decision, accused the NCAA of hypocrisy and a self–
serving agenda.136  Researchers who have analyzed the NCAA’s adjudication over 
the past couple of decades say the lack of consistency not only harms the integrity 
of college sports, but it also harms the NCAA’s image.137 
When the NCAA does not punish a school for engaging in academic fraud, it 
puts athletes’ education at risk.138  In a perfect world, student–athletes work hard in 
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the classroom as well as on the field, and they receive an education in return.139  
When education is not taken seriously, as in the case of sham classes at UNC, 
student–athletes may graduate with an inadequate education in spite of all the work 
they have put in.140  On the other hand, for those schools that are harshly punished, 
sanctions can keep athletes from competing and, consequently, put students’ future 
athletic careers in jeopardy.141 
V.  ARBITRATION CAN IMPROVE                                                                            
THE SYSTEM 
NCAA member institutions and the coaches, administrators, and student–
athletes involved could benefit greatly from a more predictable, consistently–
applied system.142  The current process is full of uncertainty and poses great risks 
both for institutions that choose to self–report, as did the University of Missouri, 
and those that do not, like UNC.143  The NCAA has undeniably struggled to balance 
the specific needs and expectations of different institutions with the responsibility 
of implementing fair policy across the board.144  At this point in time, the NCAA is 
often criticized for falling short with regard to both of those competing 
responsibilities.145  Alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), specifically arbitration, 
can address the NCAA’s current problems and elevate the system into one that is 
more balanced and respected. 
A.  The Value of ADR 
ADR, in general, could solve many of the problems posed by the current NCAA 
process.  ADR places responsibility on the parties involved to come face–to–face 
with the reality of the sanctioning process.146  For an offending institution, it creates 
an opportunity for administrators, coaches, and athletes to recognize and accept 
responsibility for the harm caused.147  ADR methods bestow upon the parties the 
power and authority to help decide what the final punishments will be.148  If any 
number of ADR processes followed self–reporting, relevant actors would have a 
real incentive to come forward: the chance to be heard and understood.149  In 
addition, the COI could listen to individuals and assess the situation instead of 
blindly searching for the mitigating factors at play.  When the selected ADR process 
came to a close, the outcry and criticism for lack of due process and fair decision–
making would be dissipated by the COI’s opportunity to help every person involved 
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understand and accept the policy that must be applied.150  ADR opportunities could 
prevent repeat offenses that often occur in institutions today, as ADR methods have 
been shown to be a more satisfying way of settling disputes.151  Mediation, for 
example, attempts to enable the parties to reach an agreement together by guiding 
them through information exchange, facilitating interest identification, and focusing 
on underlying issues in a confidential setting.152  Similarly, arbitration is known for 
its usefulness in resolving disputes between players, agents, and team management 
quickly with little–to–no publicity.153  A drawn out decision–making process harms 
student–athletes, resulting in frustration and uncertainty during an already short 
competition season.154  Even if traditional use of arbitration in NCAA disputes is 
not possible due to the lack of student–held rights, some methods used in arbitration 
could still be employed to make the infraction process more fair, consistent, and 
efficient. 
B.  Arbitration as an Alternative 
Arbitration has great potential in the context of collegiate sports, and it is 
already employed by Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Basketball 
Association (“NBA”), the National Football League (“NFL”), the National Hockey 
League (“NHL”), the Professional Golfing Association (“PGA”), and the United 
States Olympic Committee (“USOC”).155  In fact, arbitration is the most dominant 
tribunal to resolve disputes in the professional sports industry.156 
Arbitration among professional athletes started with players’ support of the 
system in regulating conflicts with their agents.157  Now, multi–layered systems 
designed to address grievances are readily offered to players and their 
administrators as a means to resolve a wide range disputes.158  Arbitrators have 
broad decision–making powers but typically do not challenge modern legal 
restraints.  Thus, arbitrators constantly balance regulation enforcement and 
equitable remedy.159  Given the widespread acceptance of this method of dispute 
resolution in the sports industry, it is a wonder that arbitration has not been 
employed in intercollegiate athletics.  That said, the disparity most likely stems 
from the fact that student–athletes lack many of the legal rights that professional 
athletes enjoy.160 
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Even with student–athletes’ limited legal rights, some of arbitration’s features 
could be mirrored to make the infraction process more speedy and equal across 
institutions.161  For example, replacing the COI with something akin to an 
arbitration panel represents a radical change that could elicit positive results.162  
Arbitration panels, comprised of appointed arbitrators well–versed in the industry, 
provide efficient, confidential dispute resolution services.163  Under a panel 
procedure, disputes would be investigated by neutral arbitrators with experience in 
sports industry matters.164  The exact form and features of such a change are 
uncertain, but the NCAA can—as a preliminary step—borrow methods from the 
professional sports industry to revitalize its current procedures. 
In the National Hockey League, players may file appeals for penalties imposed 
on them for off–ice conduct.165  An impartial arbitrator uses a standard of review 
based on whether the NHL commissioner’s penalty was supported by substantial 
evidence and was not unreasonable based on: (1) the facts and circumstances; (2) 
the proportion of the penalty to the offense; and (3) the interests of both the player 
and the NHL.166  Presently, there are three primary arguments a school can make to 
appeal NCAA penalties, and none of them take into account the best interests of the 
athletes.167  The interests of athletes, however, remain at stake.  Often times, current 
athletes are punished for misconduct committed by athletes who competed for the 
school years before and under different coaching administrations.168  The NCAA 
would do well to take student–athlete interests into account when making its 
decisions. 
For professional golf, the PGA Tour Handbook states that an arbitration panel 
has forty–five days from the start of a dispute to conduct a hearing and fifteen days 
from the close of the evidence to render a written decision.169  The University of 
Missouri’s appeal hearing was in mid–July.170  The committee typically takes 
between four and eight weeks to issue a final decision, a timeframe that already 
extends far beyond that of professional sports arbitration panels.171  Missouri 
awaited a decision until November, though the decision should have been 
announced, at the latest, by September.172  The NCAA could benefit from 
implementing a hard deadline in its appeals process to alert all actors when they 
should be prepared for a decision.  Dragging disputes through participating sports’ 
seasons when the athletes are unsure whether they will have a chance to compete in 
the post–season is frustrating and unnecessary.173 
The U.S. Olympic Committee’s arbitration method is unique because it deals 
with amateurs and professionals alike.174  The bylaws of the USOC set forth 
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regulations and penalties for violations.175  If athletes are not satisfied with the 
suggested resolution to their complaints, they can file a claim with the American 
Arbitration Association.176  The bylaws also provide a way to expedite the 
proceeding.177  In this way, the USOC has come up with a grievance process 
involving arbitration that is accessible to amateur athletes.178  The NCAA should 
act in accord with the USOC’s process for resolving disputes.179 
Replacing the COI with an arbitration panel would solve many of the above–
listed problems with current NCAA procedures.180  The NCAA’s regulations and 
bylaws act as a type of contract between the parties, and they could easily 
incorporate an arbitration clause into the required agreement.  When disputes arise, 
the NCAA could select neutral arbitrators for their panel from the American 
Arbitration Association, just like USOC,181 while ensuring that those hearing the 
dispute possess detailed sports industry knowledge.182  Arbitrators have the ability 
to issue subpoenas, so the dispute process could progress more quickly and allow 
greater access to witnesses and information.183  Arbitration would also offer parties 
more due process by requiring both the NCAA and the member institution to 
respond to the arbitration panel acting as a higher body,184 lessening the NCAA’s 
concurrent power as the prosecution and jury.185 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Competitive sports unavoidably cultivate an environment in which rule–
breaking will occur.  Academic fraud is a long–standing issue, but the NCAA has 
not handled it with fundamental fairness and efficiency.  Employing ADR methods, 
like arbitration, allows for procedural justice through discussion and decision–
making between all the parties.186  Within this decision–making process, ADR, 
particularly arbitration, provides a unique opportunity for moral growth and 
transformation.187  Professional sports administrations use arbitration because of its 
efficiency and confidentiality.188  Overall, using arbitration in tandem with 
investigation and adjudication would likely mitigate some of the widespread 
frustration with the NCAA as an entity.189  The NCAA should consider changing 
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